Public financial institutions have a major stake in the revival of sick units, because they assist most and up to well over half their invested capital. What can they do to prevent sickness?
Professor Khandwalla conducted an interview-cum-questionnaire study of officials, especially 36 rehabilitation officers closely involved with sick units.
While inappropriate management is the major cause of sickness, financial institutions' own procedures arid practices are also an important cause. Several recommendations emerge from the study for remedying the situation through early detection and timely preventive action.
Pradip N Khandwalla is L & T Professor of Organizational Behaviour at the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad.
Corporate sickness is a significant problem, not only in India, but also in many market economies. In the U K, over 10.000 units are estimated to fail each year. One out of every five firms listed on the stock exchanges turns sick (Slatter, 1984. p 18) . Out of four sick firms, only one manages a successful turnaround. According to a recent study, one out of four companies listed on the U S stock exchanges had turned sick during the decade 1967 -1976 (Bibeault, 1982 . Only a third of the sick companies recovered.
In India, it has been estimated that currently over 550 large units (twice the number in 1977) and over 130,000 small units (over six times the number in 1978) are sick, tying up nearly Rs 5,000 crore belonging to term lending institutions and banks (Gupte, 1987, p.2) . Besides, over 20 per cent of central government public enterprises are loss making (The Economic Times, July 3, 1985) . These now have a total investment of over Rs 50,000 crore.
Trends
Sickness has assumed the proportions of an epidemic. It seems to be growing. In the U K, business failures quadrupled between 1972 and 1982 (Slatter, 1984 . In India, funds of financial institutions tied up in defaulting accounts are estimated to be growing annually at over 10 per cent doubling every seven years (Khandwalla, 1981) . In fact, the rate may be accelerating. According to a Reserve Bank survey, outstanding bank credit to some 450 large sick units went up 11 per cent from Rs 1,729 crore in 1981-82 to Rs 1,913 crore in 1982-83 and that to over 60,000 sick small-scale units, it went up by nearly 60 per cent from Rs 394 crore in 1981-82 to Rs 627 crore. The overall rate of increase in bank credit to sick units was about 20 per cent in 1982 -83 (Gupte, 1985 Pillai, 1985) .
Rising Incidence
The problem of sickness in India is likely to grow worse. The number of new units coming up every year is growing. Currently, some 10,000 new units come up every year, thanks to various incentives offered by the government, the financial support provided by the apex and state level financial institutions, and the facilities provided in industrial estates. The percentage of entrepreneurs receiving any. sort of training in setting up and managing units is miniscule. Inadequate capacity to manage units may mean more and more units turning sick. Besides, liberalization of the economy and the advent of "sunrise" industries are likely to accelerate the pace of entrepreneurship. Equally, the liberalization of the licensing policy and of imports is likely to intensify competition. In such an environment, the incidence of sickness may well rise.
Potential for Reducing Sickness
Economic development probably implies some industrial sickness. But its ravages can be reduced. An officer of the Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation estimated that about a quarter of the 8,000-odd units in the GIDC sheds were sick. But of these, as many as 60 percent were in his opinion, salvageable with better management. Based on viability studies, a Reserve Bank of India study estimated that 84 per cent of large sick firms and about 10 per cent of the small sick units were potentially viable (Gupte, 1985) . The potential for reducing sickness is large. Besides, if effective steps can be taken, the incidence of sickness could itself be lowered. The incidence of sickness can be cut by half by devising steps to prevent sickness and by strengthening the machinery to turnaround salvageable sick units.
The Study
A questionnaire and interview survey was conducted to assess the major causes of sickness in India and the mechanisms available to financial institutions to prevent sickness. The respondents were 36 rehabilitation officers of Indian banks and financial institutions. Apart from inadequate management, deficiency in the way financial institutions deal with client units emerged as a significant cause of sickness. current ratio less than 1:1, worsening debt-equity ratio (Bidani & Mitra, 1981, p 26) . The term lending institutions consider a unit as sick if it has consecutively defaulted on four half-yearly loans and interest instalments, has made cash losses for two consecutive years or has lost 50 per cent of its net worth, and has mounting arrears of statutory and other liabilities (Bidani and Mitra, 1981, p 26 ).
In judging a unit's on-going performance, it is useful to gauge its extent of sickness. Comparing its current performance with its performance under comparable business conditions in the past, and its current performance with other comparable units in the industry known to be efficiently managed, can provide clues. These two comparisons provide a rough indication of how far below its performance potential the unit is operating. A unit may be considered sick when it is operating way below its performance potential, even if it is not making cash losses or defaulting, and prospects are not good for improved operations closer to performance potential (Khandwalla, 1981) .
There should be no confusion between sickness of the unit and poor performance beyond the control of the unit's management. A unit may be making cash losses because the industry itself is in a deep recession. In such a case, the industry is sick, not the unit. Any revival action should be industry-oriented rather than unit-oriented.
Revival efforts initiated early, when the unit is performing well below its potential, yield better dividends than when the unit is officially sick (Khandwalla, 1981) . Identification of relatively poor performance can cue the unit and the financial institutions to early revival efforts without waiting for the unit to make cash losses. Earlier the revival efforts, the faster, more effective, and less expensive is the turnaround. From a social viewpoint, the closer the enterprises operate to their performance potential, the better generally is the resource utilization. Any efforts of stakeholders, including the management, the government, and the financial institutions to keep enterprises operating at or near their performance potential would yield good dividends for the economy.
What is Sickness?
The Reserve Bank of India considers a unit sick if it has incurred a cash loss for a year and is likely to incur a cash loss in the current and coming years, along with a poor financial structure, that is,
What Leads to Sickness?
Most studies agree that sickness can be caused by a wide variety of factors (Argenti, 1976) . Broadly speaking, sickness can be caused by factors internal to the organization, such as inadequate management, wrong technology, or a sub-optimal plant, and/or by factors external to the organization, like increased competitive pressure, recession, input shortages, changes in government policies, or disturbed industrial relations.
External Vs. Internal Factors
Even in America, external factors-slumps, exchange rate changes, credit squeezes, and inflation -were considered responsible for only about 10 per cent of corporate declines. On the other hand, internal causes of decline, such as one man rule, lack of management depth, succession problems, inbred bureaucratic management, weak financial control, an unbalanced top management, and a weak board, accounted for about 70 per cent of declines. The remaining 20 per cent declines were caused by a mix of external and internal factors (Bibeault, 1982, Ch 5) .
A study of 378 large sick units commissioned by the Reserve Bank of India in 1981 also indicated that about two-thirds of the units had become sick due to mismanagement of one kind or anotherdiversion of funds, infighting, lack of marketing strategies, faulty project planning, and faulty choice of technology (Morris, 1982, p.47) . External causes accounted for the sickness of the remaining . units. Market recession contributed to the sickness of 23 per cent. Besides being the prime cause of most sickness, inadequate management is also a strong secondary or contributory cause. As a British researcher put it: "...a crisis situation is likely to occur most frequently when a firm, already weakened by poor management, lack of control and inefficiency, is subjected to adverse movements in market demand and commodity prices, price competition and ... problems resulting from the so-called big project." (Slatter, 1984, p.55) .
Concentration of Corporate Sickness
There is evidence that corporate sickness is concentrated in some regions, industries, and sectors.
Regional Concentration. A 1983 Reserve Bank of India survey indicated that corporate sickness is in part a regional phenomenon. For instance, West Bengal accounted for 23 per cent of the 463 large sick units and 19 per cent of the small sick units. Other states with many large and small sick units were Maharashtra* U P, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka. The two states of West Bengal and Maharashtra accounted for about half the large sick units in the country.
Industry-Specific Concentration. Sickness may also be partly an industry phenomenon (Dixit, 1984) . For instance, upto 1982, just four industriestextiles, rubber products, transport equipment, and metal products-accounted for 72 per cent of the assistance sanctioned by the Industrial Reconstruction Corporation of India, an institution devoted entirely to rehabilitating sick units..
Sectoral Concentration.
Sickness may in part be a sectoral phenomenon. A study in the mid-seventies indicated that the profitability of large private sector companies was generally far higher than that of central public sector enterprises in the same industries (Sri Ram et al, 1976) . Also, while less than 15 per cent of large private sector companies were sick, over 20 per cent of central public sector units in any year were loss making.
Major Causes of Sickness
The major causes of corporate sickness are:
• Poor Quality of Top Management • Poor Project Management • Organizational Transition
• Bureaucratization
These are briefly explained below.
Poor Quality of Top Management. The poor quality of top management may show in one of several forms: excessive conservatism, excessive complacency, growth mania, poor financial control, excessive centralization and authoritarianism, weak board and a weak watchdog 'function, excessive commitment to policies that worked well once but are no longer appropriate, poor financial or marketing management (Hegde, 1982) .
Poor Project Management. Project cost escalation may be a significant promoter of sickness in India (Bidani and Mitra, 1981, pp 59-60) . In many industries, project costs have doubled or tripled over a decade. The problem is aggravated by cost overruns. Thus, delays in commissioning projects may seriously inflate costs and render a unit nonviable. Besides, cost per ton of capacity can vary widely-by factors ranging from two to fourdepending on the size of the plant. Wrong choices of plant size and technology can lead to sickness.
Organizational Transition. Many declines tend to take place during organizational transitions (Bibeault, 1982, p 18) . Some 40 per cent of the 81 turnaround cases studied by Bibeault were in transition during the decline phase. For instance, once an entrepreneurial venture has been established, the failure to induct a professional manager to set up systems such as financial control and production planning may lead to sickness; if a professional manager is hired, and the organization grows, excessive centralization may lead to sickness. If decentralization takes place, and a management control system is in operation, the depersonalization that follows may cause sickness, unless management infuses core values in the rank and file that can act as a binding force.
Organizational Size and Bureaucratization. Organizational size often leads to bureaucratization, which may be an important cause of sickness. Large size implies growing reliance on rules and regulations, hierarchy, and specialization of functions. These, in turn, can lead to alienation of staff, distorted communications, administrative rigidity, interdepartmental conflicts, and sub-optimization, leading to sickness (Blau, 1980; Crazier, 1964; Gouldner, 1954; Khandwalla, 1977, Ch 13) .
Easier to Remedy Major Causes
The major causes of sickness are not necessarily the major inhibitors of revival. For instance, in a British study of 40 turnaround cases, the four major causes of sickness were found to be lack of financial control, an inadequate chief executive, price competition, and operating inefficiency (Slatter, 1984, p.53) . However, of the four, only price competition was found to be a major inhibitor of recovery. In other words, not only was price competition a common cause of sickness, the chances of recovery of units falling sick because of price competition tended to be slim. Three other major inhibitors of recovery were a sub-optimal plant, high overheads, and weak marketing. The more the major inhibitors of recovery show up as the causes of sickness of a unit, the less salvageable is the unit. The other major causes-poor financial control, an inappropriate chief executive, and operating inefficiency are easier to remedy.
Lead Indicators of Corporate Sickness
What are the lead or predictive indicators of corporate sickness? An Indian study has identified the lead indicators of sickness, applying discriminate analysis to financial indicators over the 13-year period, 1962-74, to a sample of 40 cotton textile companies (Gupta, 1983) . Certain earnings ratios gave the best results. They were:
• earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation to sales • earnings after interest and taxes, but before depreciation, to gross assets.
The study also found that ratios related to net worth and liquidity were not as reliable. Although balance sheet ratios were not as good a set of predictors as profitability ratios, the two ratios that were found to be useable were:
• net worth to short-and long-term debt • all outside liabilities to tangible assets.
The View from the Rehabilitation Desk
Sickness is a complex, multidimensional phenomenon caused by different constellations of interacting causes. The perceptions of officials of financial institutions, who deal with these complex problems on a continuing basis, would be important.
Forty causes of sickness were identified during interviews with officers of the apex term lending institutions-Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI), Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI), and the Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI). They covered:
• industry-specific factors like recession and competition • government-related factors like poor maintenance of law and order, inadequate provision of infrastructural facilities, and frequent changes in government policies • financial institution-related factors such as deficiency in support • management-related factors.
A questionnaire was developed to assess the rela-tive importance of the various factors. Thirty-six rehabilitation officers dealing with sick units from two apex financial institutions (IDBI and ICICI) and commercial banks scored items on a four-point scale to rate the importance of each cause. These officers had been with their respective institutions for an average of about 16 years, and had been inv o l v e d i n monitoring and assisting sick units for an average of nearly three years. Of these 36 officers, ten belonged to IDBI, four to ICICI, six to the State Bank and its subsidiaries, 11 to the other nationalized banks, and the remaining five to private sector banks.
Classification of Causes
Each cause was classified as major, moderate, or minor based on its average score. Causes with a mean score of 2.8 and above were considered major, those with means between 2.3 and 2.7 were considered moderate, and those with means below 2.3 were considered minor. Table 1 presents the causes thus classified.
Major Causes. As many as ten out of 13 major causes were management-related. They included corrupt management, inadequacies in functional management (finance, manufacturing, marketing), poor general management (too much centralization in decision making, low commitment to professional management, weak control by the board, lack of cohesion due to infighting), and poor initial choices of technology and investment. Two major causes were government-related: frequent policy changes, and inadequate power/fuel supply. The thirteenth major cause was disturbed industrial relations.
Moderate Causes. The moderate causes of sickness included adverse industry conditions (excess capacity, competition, stagnation or recession); adverse government behaviour (price control, erratic availability of inputs, liberalized imports of competing products); adverse behaviour of financial institutions (delay in providing finance, inadequate provision of working capital and investment finance, and poor assessment of project finance proposals); and poor unit management (conservatism, bureaucratic functioning, slackness, nepotism, and poor image). As many as ten out of IS moderate causes of sickness were seen to relate to external factors.
Minor Causes. The minor causes may well be major causes in particular situations. However, they were seen to be minor overall and included political interference, interference by financial institutions in the management of the unit, poor law and order situation, and unhelpful governmental machinery.
Prime Contributor to Sickness
In the judgement of the rehabilitation officers, the number one contributor to sickness is the unit's management, although the conditions in the unit's industry and the errors of omission and commission by the government and the financial institutions are significant contributory factors.
Constellation of Causes
It may be that some causes tend to occur together because of mutual causation or otherwise. These syndromes or constellations of causes could be particularly powerful sources of sickness. To identify such constellations, the data on the 40 causes of sickness were subjected to factor analysis (varimax rotation of principal components). Eleven factors emerged, each with a minimum eigen value of 1.00. They are shown in Table 2 .
These 11 factors explained 80 per cent of the total variance in the 40 variables. Three factorstraditional management, poor support of financial institutions to the unit, and adverse government behaviour explained nearly half of the variance explained by the 11 factors, each explaining more than 10 per cent of the total variance. The three factors and the highest loading variables were:
• traditional management-nepotism, weak board, and excessive centralization • financial institutions-insufficient supply of working and long term capital to the unit and delay in sanctioning funds • government-political interference, unhelpful governmental machinery, and bad law and order situation.
Poor Support of Financial Institutions
The 36 respondents were asked to list sickness producing factors not covered by the 40 items listed in the questionnaire. The additional causes of sickness that the officers cited are given in Table 3 .
Some of the causes of sickness they listed are:
• softness of financial institutions in dealing with incompetent managements • lack of coordination and information sharing between the financial institutions, banks, and relevant government agencies • weak control of the financial institutions over project implementation • reliefs and concessions that seem to reward sickness; difficulties of units with projects in backward areas • the inability of financial institutions to detect sickness early • diversion of short term funds for long term uses (and, possibly, vice versa) • lack of cooperation of state financial corporations • delays in obtaining payments from government agencies.
Although serious, most of the causes listed above are remediable. They relate to financial institutions, and their relationship with the unit, the banks, and the government. Especially critical are:
• better project appraisal and monitoring of project implementation • timely detection of sickness. and quick, coordinated response to it • reliefs and concessions only to units with competent and ethical management.
What Can Financial Institutions Do?
Initial interviews with officers of apex and other financial institutions indicated 15 mechanisms that the financial institutions use, or can use, to prevent sickness. The 36 rehabilitation officers of financial institutions and banks rated the usefulness of each of these mechanisms on a four-point scale. Table 4 lists these mechanisms in the order of their perceived usefulness.
More Useful Mechanisms. The periodic financial report from the unit was seen as the most useful followed by periodic inspection visits to the unit, inter-institutional meetings, independent assessment by financial institutions of the projections made by the unit for getting project finance, formal training for financial institution officers playing a monitoring role vis-a-vis units, market intelligence cells within financial institutions. The combined wisdom of rehabilitation officers points to the efficacy of:
• continuous monitoring of the unit right from the project finance proposal stage • a professional response to the needs and problems of the client unit.
Less Useful Mechanisms. Good character certificates for chief executives of units seeking project finance, outsider nominees of financial institutions on the boards of borrowing units, the use of external consultants to evaluate funding requests, compulsory management training requirement for the top executives of borrowing units, and financial institution's nominees on client's board were seen as much less useful.
Additional Mechanisms
The respondents were asked to list additional sickness preventing mechanisms. Table 5 lists the additional mechanisms they suggested.
Some of the interesting suggestions are:
• a smaller project finance consortium to facilitate quicker response to sickness • greater autonomy to monitoring officers in the financial institutions • better liaison with the assisted units through, for example, officers of financial institutions being on deputation.
Reducing the size of the consortium makes sense, especially for relatively modest project finance proposals that do not involve a large risk to any financial institution. Greater autonomy for monitoring officers, and officers being sent as advisers, can be effective if these officers are welltrained in professional industrial and financial management. Otherwise, they may aggravate sickness 1 through uninformed interference.
Besides these possibilities, the "premium rebate for no claim" idea in insurance is worth considering, that is, there could be incentives for remaining healthy such as interest rebates that increase with the period of health. Equally, of course, there could be penalty interest on avoidable project cost escalations, due, for example, to avoidable delay in project implementation, and amateurish sales and profit projections that subsequently go haywire (provided, of course, that this additional interest burden does not push a unit into sickness)
Revival of Units
Experts have suggested that for revival purposes, it may be useful to distinguish three types of sickness situations-the hopeless cases, short-term survivors and sustained recovery possibilities (Slatter, 1984, pp 115-120) .
The hopeless case is characterized by such factors as a severe decline in the unit's core business area; a single product, single plant operation that makes divestiture difficult; and relatively high fixed costs in relation to value added, which makes the unit highly vulnerable to even modest business declines. The short-term survivors can break even for a while but have no long-term competitive advantage. They may survive in a boom but are likely to go under in a recession. The third category consists of those with potential for sustainable recovery. They have a good product or process base; and their sickness is due primarily to poor management.
The policy implication for financial institutions would be to stop assistance to the hopeless cases, give full but conditional assistance to those with potential for sustainable recovery, with some ambiguity about what to do vis-a-vis the short-term survivors. The earlier, and better, the diagnosis, the lower would be the costs of effective action.
Conclusion
This study confirms the findings of earlier studies that the major cause of enterprise sickness is inappropriate management. Such external causes as recession and competition are essentially secondary factors, although they could be primary in particular instances.
Earlier studies glossed over sickness arising from the way the financial institutions treat units; the present study indicates that this may be a significant cause of sickness. The present study has identified several clusters of causes. Clusters of causes may have more devastating consequences than any single cause. They provide a typology for developing turnaround strategies, each appropriate for a major cluster.
The prime responsibility for preventing sickness obviously rests with the units and their managements. However, since inappropriate management is a major cause of sickness, the government and the financial institutions have a major responsibility for detecting incipient sickness and preventing it. To this end, the government has taken a number of policy decisions, ranging from setting up review boards, throwing responsibility on the management to inform these boards of sickness, giving tax incentives to healthy units to absorb sick units, and prescribing severe penalties for managements that wilfully make a unit sick.
The responsibility of the financial institutions for detecting and preventing sickness is clear: they generally contribute well over half the capital employed in the assisted units. Besides, they are in a strong position both to detect sickness early and to prevent it, because of their day-to-day dealings with their clients. Gearing the financial institutions , up for the early detection and prevention of sickness is the major hope for bottling the jinn of sickness. Our findings support developing an institutional system as proposed in Exhibit 1.
The main elements of the model are:
• careful project appraisal • continuous monitoring of units, especially during project implementation • a professional, speedy, and coordinated intitutional response to the problems of the units • installation of required systems at the units • incentives for remaining healthy and disincentives for actions contributing to sickness. • Monthly or quarterly financial statements submitted by the company to the financial institutions 1 • Periodic inspection visits by individuals or teams from financial institutions 2 • Periodic meetings of the representatives of the financial institutions to exchange information about industries 3 and common clients • Independent assessment by financial institutions, through market research methods, of the appropriateness of 4 sales projections and profitability submitted in funding requests by clients • Programmes to train persons within financial institutions for monitoring and client assessment roles 5
• Market intelligence cells that keep in touch with informative contacts (bankers, shareholders, dalals, merchants, 6 industrialists) for monitoring the problems and prospects of client units
• Appointment of internal and/or statutory auditors of the clients with the approval of financial institutions 7 • The lead agency concept among financial institutions (i.e. coordination of assistance to client by an agreed upon 8 lead financial institution) • Desk officers, or contact persons in the financial institutions, each of whom specializes in the affairs of a few 9 designated units • Industry cells in financial institutions that keep in touch with the developments in the industry, its problems, 10 short and long term prospects • Nominees from within financial institutions on the company's board 11 • Requirement that top managers of client undergo at least a short duration course in project management and 12 general management before the client organization makes a funding request • Use of external consultants to evaluate sizeable funding requests from clients 13 • Nominees of financial institutions on client's board from outside financial institutions 14 • Good character certificates from bankers, reputed industrialists, trade or industry association required to be 15 furnished by chief executive of client at the time of loan application.
Table 5: Additional Sickness Prevention Mechanisms Suggested by Rehabilitation Officers
• Deputing an officer of a financial institution on whole-time basis, not as a substitute for, but as an adviser to, existing management.
• Deputation of officers of financial institutions to industry and vice versa.
• Individual officers of financial institutions should be designated to be in charge of one or two problem-prone units and given independence, discretion, and accountability.
• Financial institutions should organize themselves and establish a system of communication with the assisted units to be in a position to anticipate problems.
• Concentrate on areas of weakness and trends in operational spheres likely to adversely affect the health of the unit, with discretion to the agencies to take prompt and appropriate action.
• Reduction in the number of institutions/banks assisting each project to have speedy consortium decisions on the revival strategies of sick units.
• Quick and prompt payment of bills drawn by units.
• Training in procedures and formalities of sales tax, ESI, central excise and other statutory obligations to be given to managers of units.
